Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. The pre-World War II Navy was centered upon the independent battleship. Much like the modern air base, the battleship was a lethal, heavily armed, and potent symbol of global power projection. The battleship was characterized by its self-sufficiency on the open seas. Nothing could challenge its dominance.1 Unfortunately, the modern air base often times operates as if it too were alone on the open seas with no discernable threat able to encroach on its security zone undetected. Air base security posture frequently ignores the immense capabilities in the civilian community that can be incorporated into base security planning. Just as the U.S. Navy abandoned the battleship, it&#8223;s time the Air Force abandon its battleship mentality of force protection. In an age of asymmetric warfare and terrorism it is important to know thy enemy. In particular, the focus is primarily upon Al Qaeda and those who identify with its ideology (AQAM). We have already historically seen Al Qaeda maintain focus on one target set until it achieves its objectives. 
1 Unfortunately, the modern air base often times operates as if it too were alone on the open seas with no discernable threat able to encroach on its security zone undetected. Air base security posture frequently ignores the immense capabilities in the civilian community that can be incorporated into base security planning. Just as the U.S.
Navy abandoned the battleship, it"s time the Air Force abandon its "battleship mentality" of force protection.
In an age of asymmetric warfare and terrorism it is important to know thy enemy. In particular, the focus is primarily upon Al Qaeda and those who identify with its ideology (AQAM). We have already historically seen Al Qaeda maintain focus on one target set until it achieves its objectives. The first and second attacks on the World Trade Center exemplify this
focus. Through open source reporting we have seen AQAM attempt to attack CONUS installations in New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania 2 . Provided AQ, or its believers, have not radically changed their method of operation, we should expect that they will continue to target CONUS military installations. An attack on an air base would have immense strategic value. AQAM has shown that is has the intent to attack US-based installations -the question for us is how we can prevent them from obtaining the opportunity and capability to do so. McElroy, and TSgt Jason Norton, all of whom gave the ultimate sacrifice fighting America"s enemies, we owe our eternal gratitude. The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon marked the opening salvo in what would become the Global War on Terrorism. It also marked a significant change in the tactics used by terrorists in their war against the U.S. and the West -a decided effort to hit America on its own turf. The attacks were symbolic in that the Al Qaeda network attempted to attack the full spectrum of the American instruments of power. In the seven years since the attack, the U.S. has engaged terror networks throughout the world using military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement and financial institutions in an attempt to achieve decisive victory. Despite these efforts, AQAM has still managed to execute deadly attacks in the West and against western interests. Most concerning for military force protection professionals have been attempts to attack military installations located in the continental United States (CONUS).
SECTION 1 -INTRODUCTION
The Air Force primarily defends its installations through the use of security forces (SF). 4 Unfortunately, the doctrine and guidance which directs the employment of these forces has been slow to evolve to the threat of modern terrorism. Instead it still primarily relies upon installation entry control points and random patrolling. There is an overwhelming tendency for these forces to focus efforts on policing the force versus protecting the force. Furthermore, the response forces tend to be concentrated in the vicinity of high value assets (aircraft, weapon systems, etc.).
In essence, the response force is positioned to engage an adversary once he has already arrived at the resource.
Ground intelligence is similarly lacking. The author"s experience with wing intelligence briefs to senior staff has been international focused updates on world crisis spots and far-away enemy capabilities. This information has strategic value but tactically the information does nothing to protect and defend the mission of the installation. Simply put, local ground intelligence is, in the author"s experience, lacking. It is further exacerbated by having four separate investigative and intelligence agencies on the installation operating under four different chains of command. The lack of unity of command prevents a common operating picture to properly employ ground-based response forces.
In short, the current U.S. Air Force force protection (FP) efforts at US-based (CONUS)
installations are inadequate and need to be dramatically overhauled to match the current nature of modern terrorist warfare. Local civilian law enforcement and intelligence sharing organizations in the communities surrounding our installations already exist, however, lack of active membership, participation and involvement hinders our FP effectiveness. The AF can maximize economy of force through interagency cooperation and partnership.
The purpose of this paper is not to "throw rocks" at the Security Forces, OSI, Intelligence, or Force Protection Officer career fields. There are severe impacts from the operations tempo over the past seven years on the fore-mentioned career fields. Their contributions at home and abroad have been instrumental to the success in the War on Terror.
The success in combat however should not distract us from evolving to protect air power in our own backyards.
Significance
The evolutionary study of the ground defense of air power is vital to educating airmen on the dangerous implications of ignoring the vulnerability of assets on the ground. Air bases have historically been attacked as a way of pursuing a broad range of objectives, from the ambitious goal of capturing an airfield to the minimalist goal of harassing air base operations. 5 The USAF experience has typically been void of ground threat to air bases and the asymmetric threat to airmen on the ground in Vietnam and Saudi Arabia were treated as anomalies. The changing nature of war drives reconsideration of this vulnerability to the national ability to project power.
The focus of this research is "rear area" and CONUS air bases. The preponderance of existing research has focused on the defense of air power in combat zones. Palmer, Air Base Security Operation, 26 in Vietnam and Iraq were no where near as catastrophic as the almost total destruction of the El Salvador Air Force, it does show that our assets are being targeted.
It is not beyond the realm of possibilities that as war zone targeting remains relatively unsuccessful in deterring air power that adversaries will refocus their efforts on more lightly defended targets. An Al Qaeda inspired organization has already shown intent to attack CONUS-based installations. The "Fort Dix Six" as they are known "planned to storm the base armed with automatic rifles and kill as many soldiers as possible."
12 The cell also conducted surveillance on Dover AFB but chose to avoid that target based on the "assessment that the base was too difficult of a target because of its high security." 13 This is the first publicly known instance in which air power has been targeted domestically. The attack eerily resembled the 1983 attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon. It also served as a notice that airmen and their installations were considered "fair game" by terrorists.
The Air Force mindset of security from "within the wire" has been firmly established by historical engagements dating back to the first use of airpower in conflict. Vietnam should have served notice that protecting air power on the ground should have a higher priority but it did not.
It should have served as a call to move "outside the wire" to dominate a base security zone. It was not until after the Khobar incident, that the Chief of Staff, General Ronald Fogleman, stated "Security no longer ends at the base perimeter. We must assume responsibility for a much larger tactical perimeter that will keep the threat away from our people and our equipment."
24

Ground Intelligence
The key to dominating terrain and personnel "outside the wire" is good intelligence. Force provided a damning assessment of the service"s ground intelligence capabilities. Finding #11 found, "the lack of an organic intelligence support capability in US Air Force Security
Unfortunately this is another area in which the
Police units adversely affects their ability to accomplish the base defense mission." 31 The report further detailed an inefficient intelligence chain of command which focused entirely on the air threat during Operation Southern Watch. The OSI had previously noted "the potential for an attack from outside the perimeter, but these recommendations were never given to the installation commander. Additionally, upon completing an assessment of physical security on the base, one OSI agent recommended the construction of a blast mitigation wall to his supervisor. This information never reached the base commander because the OSI supervisor, believing the blast wall had been discussed and rejected previously; felt it was an unwarranted recommendation"
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The historical service focus on solely producing an air intelligence sight picture exposed a soft rear area ripe for enemy attack. The service however continued to view the threat and need for an effective ground intelligence program as an anomaly. Thus the "battleship" continued to float on unaware of local threats and with little effort to create local tactical intelligence. For CONUS installations, the prevailing perspective was the threat existed "over there." Conceptually this concept makes sense and it can be effective. However, the majority of USAF defense forces are dedicated to entry control and near-static resource defense. The "integrated capability" is typically left to the installation defense forces instead of being a whole base effort.
Base patrolling is typically restricted to internal patrol sectors and conducted randomly at the whim of the patrol officer. It is highly subject to being utilized for parking details, loose pet apprehension, and other administrative details that are not focused on the defense of air power.
Further compounding the problem, high deployment rates and constant post rotations do not allow patrol officers to become intimately familiar with their beats. The result is an effort that is resource-vice person-focused and distracted by non-defense and policing associated tasks.
Counterterror and policing patrols focus on presence. This is the concept that the presence of a police patrol will have the effect of deterring crime. This conceptualization is faulty. In addition, there has typically been no attempt to physically or psychologically dominate the terrain (base security zone) outside the perimeter fence. Relations with local police and intelligence forces vary widely by installation and are typically personality based. They flourish or diminish with the rotation of commanders and staffs. Relationships with local residents and businesses in the area around the installation are similarly non-existent. Thus, the persons who are likely to first encounter suspicious activity in the base security zone may or may not inform the installation or local police forces. Overall, in order to properly defend air power the current method of operation needs to change to reflect an asymmetric response to an asymmetric threat.
The logical move to respond to an asymmetric threat to air power is to implement a patrol and security scheme that is driven by local ground intelligence. This will require a mindset change and a focus on integrating with local police and intelligence agencies on more than an ad hoc basis. It will also require the development of memorandums of understanding with local communities as we seek to dominate the base security zone.
The first step in revitalizing air power defense is to focus on installation entry control procedures. Once the base perimeter is hardened with vehicle denial cabling and perimeter sensors to detect unauthorized entry, the ECP becomes the weakest link in the defense chain.
The focus of base ECPs should not be expediency of entry but on the defense of air power. identified as having outstanding felony warrants ranging from drug offenses to major violent crimes. 41 The capability to conduct instantaneous wants and warrants checks at ECPs through the state or national criminal database should be implemented immediately. Similarly, blanket approvals for entry to the installation for should be limited and require the approval of the installation commander. Installation patrolling and response forces are the next areas that require adjustment.
Patrols are currently divided into security response patrols (internal/external security patrols) and law enforcement patrols. The contribution of law enforcement and security to integrated defense should not be understated. However, maintaining an internal focus creates a level of animosity between the security force and the population it is in place to protect. The same people who are asked to be the installation "sensor system." To overcome this potential animosity, the focus should be directed toward "outsiders" and problem-oriented policing used to address internal problems. Doing this we can win the "hearts and minds" of the base populace thereby making them more likely to report activity, thereby becoming, in effect, a secondary "sensor system."
The concept of the Community Liaison Officer (CLO) is not new to the civilian communities. It is relatively foreign to military installations. The CLO is a single patrol officer that is dedicated to high population areas such as housing and community areas. Ideally they have office space in the local community center and have access to a golf cart to "patrol" their assigned area. "Patrol" in this instance is more of a meet and greet function and being a familiar face to local residents. The role of the CLO is to implement a problem-oriented policing solution to reduce criminal activity or nuisances in population area. By being permanently assigned to a "beat," the officer becomes a part of the community and develops an awareness of bad actors in the area and local trends. They assist in developing community based solutions to problems.
The CLO should be assigned to the Security Forces Intelligence and Investigations branch and should be a sitting member of the installation intelligence fusion cell.
The protection and safety of personnel is not to be disregarded and there is still an active need and role for traditional law enforcement in base defense. Policing vehicular traffic is a vital cog in an installation safety program. It also provides an opportunity for contact with offenders. It should be noted that Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh was caught on a traffic stop. 42 However, instead of the prescribed 24/7 police patrol, it should be focused on peak traffic periods with random implementation during non-peak hours. Manpower saved by using only one patrol for this service can be reallocated a counter-threat patrol.
Counter-threat patrols are permanent teams trained to conduct emergency response, highvisibility counter threat presence, as well as advanced law enforcement and problem-oriented policing skills. They should be directed to patrol areas as determined by the installation intelligence fusion cell and the DFC intent. They maintain a secondary response to incidents involving high-risk or priority resources. They can also be used to provide presence in the Base Security Zone to deter perimeter surveillance and conduct Random Anti-Terrorism Measures (RAMs) on the installation. They must be highly flexible, highly mobile, and highly visible.
Security patrols assigned to protect physical resources should be moved as far out from the resources as possible and focus on likely avenues of approach. This is should particularly be considered during hours when maintenance and operations work hours. In essence, the armed patrols should focus on external threats from likely avenues of approach while maintenance and operations personnel, close in on the resource, provide the final sensor line. Protection of vital warfighting air power assets needs to be a community affair.
The overall key to implementing a successful, threat-based, community-oriented patrol scheme as described above is access to good ground intelligence. The CLO and counter-threat teams, when properly trained, can become invaluable sources of information to drive operational patrols. The installation IFC should further be integrated into the local community to ensure they develop a full-spectrum sight picture. In this instance a clear division of labor between the installation defense force and OSI needs to be established. The typical OSI detachment simply does not have the manpower resources to be present at all community organizations, thus a division of labor is necessary. Off-the-installation representation should be provided at local detectives meetings, terrorism task forces, and major crimes boards. The purpose, in addition to gaining a local threat intelligence picture, is to develop strong interpersonal relationships between individuals and agencies. These relationships can pay huge dividends in times of crisis.
It is also vital that the DFC also be integrated into the local law enforcement and intelligence communities. Membership and attendance at senior law enforcement groups such as the state Chiefs of Police and local Chief"s boards should be mandatory and an IG inspectable item.
The final step in revamping force protection operations beyond the battleship mentality is to develop a methodology and ideology of dominating the area of influence outside the base perimeter. This domination should be done physically (where permissible) and psychologically.
It will require a strong partnership between the installation defense force, OSI, and the local jurisdiction.
Defining and Dominating the Base Security Zone
Defense forces were able to dominate the area "outside the wire" against an asymmetric foe in Vietnam. The application of these principles can be used to defend today"s air bases. The area outside the wire is referred to in developing air power doctrine at the Base Security Zone (BSZ). It is defined as:
"The area outside the base perimeter from which the base may be vulnerable from standoff threats (e.g. mortars, rockets, MANPADS). The base commander is responsible for identifying the base security zone and coordinate with the host nation or area commander for the base security zone to be identified as the base boundary. If the base boundary does not include all of the terrain of the base security zone, the base commander is still responsible for either mitigating (though coordination with the area commander of host nation) or accepting the risks of enemy attack from the area the terrain outside the base boundary. Base security zone is an Air Force-specific term that should be used intra-Service only." The ability to dominate the BSZ will be largely determined by METT-TC. 45 For most installations, terrain and civil considerations will determine the BSZ domination planning. The overall goal of BSZ domination is to prevent threats to airpower and prevent the "gathering of information about the enemy, the land, the installations, and the neighbors." 46 The first step is to develop a community-based approach to policing the BSZ. 50 The Buffer Zone Protection Program is specific to the State of Arizona and is designed to protect the area around the perimeter of critical infrastructure. It is discussed in further detail later in this paper.
SECTION 4 -INTERAGENCY CASE STUDY
There are enormous benefits available to base defense forces through participating in "a cross-jurisdictional partnership, integrating local, state, and federal law enforcement as well as first responders, emergency management and, when appropriate the private sector. It was "established to serve as a multi-agency center analyzing and integrating all intelligence pertaining to terrorism, including threats to US interests at home and abroad." 53 State intelligence fusion centers provide this at the operational and tactical level.
The Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC)
"In the early morning hours of September 9, 2001, a Maryland State Trooper made a routine traffic stop, pulling over a car headed north on I-95 and issued a speeding ticket. Two days later, the driver of that car, Ziad Jarrah was one of the four hijackers aboard United Airlines Flight 93 when it crashed in western Pennsylvania. The officer who issued the speeding ticket had no idea that Jarrah was on a CIA watch list. If he had, experts say, it is possible he might have prevented, or at least disrupted, the worst terrorist attack in history." The aftermath of the September 11 th attacks led the law enforcement and intelligence community to relook the way it collected, but more importantly, shared counter-terrorism and criminal intelligence. It was discovered that "no single agency or intelligence function currently maintains all the significant information required to properly defend this nation." 55 One of the results of this internal look was the development of intelligence fusion centers at the state level.
As of two years ago, there were 42 of these state fusion centers in operation. The Arizona
Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) is an example of the synergy that can develop when multiple agencies come together with a common goal and understanding.
The mission of ACTIC "is to protect the citizens and infrastructures of Arizona by enhancing intelligence and domestic preparedness operations for all local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies." 56 The center is operated by the Arizona Department of Public Safety and is charged with being an "interagency intelligence operation that is the centerpiece of Arizona"s Homeland Security detection and prevention strategy." 57 The center"s concept of operations focused on not reinventing the intelligence wheel. Instead it sought to build upon existing criminal intelligence systems already existing within the state of Arizona. It co-located federal, state, and local officers in one location.
There are 44 participating agencies which participate in either a full-time or part-time arrangement. The center combines capabilities to provide counter-terror monitoring, prevention and response in the areas of WMD, computer forensics, facial recognition, and violent criminal apprehension. Participating agencies include police, fire, and emergency services departments from across the state. All participants agree to provide ACTIC access to their criminal and counter terror data bases to all other participating agencies in accordance with law and agency 55 The Glendale PD contacted ACTIC and investigators from the center along with agents from the JTTF responded. They determined the emails were fraudulent despite the appearance that they were sent by security operators tasked with supporting the Super Bowl. Using the abilities inherent to ACTIC and the JTTF, it was determined the emails were "indirectly connected to a company located in a foreign country." 66 The originators of the emails were subsequently located and detained while attending the Fiesta Bowl "with the purpose of conducting surveillance for an operation they intended on carrying out during the Super Bowl." 
SECTION 5 -CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The USAF must move beyond the "battleship" force protection mentality of using its defense and intelligence forces in an antiquated manner. The key to good home station force protection is having a good home station ground intelligence capability that drives effective force protection operations. In the majority of states, intelligence fusion centers provide this capability. The cost of investment is relatively cheap when compared to the costs of blind patrolling and installation hardening. Furthermore, USAF involvement benefits the local communities in which they reside. To achieve this new paradigm of intelligence-driven policing to defend air power, I provide four recommendations. Commander. This current structure leaves the collection and analysis in the hands of an organization that is not responsible to the commanders who rely on the information to defend air power, thus it violates the principle of unity of command. The DFC is the sole individual responsible for the ground defense of air power. As this research has attempted to prove, good intelligence is vital to good defense. In order to ensure that the correct site picture is being presented to the DFC and therefore the installation commander, the DFC should have funding with service support capabilities such as child care, lodging, and recreation. BOS is also the most likely funding area to be cut, or taxed, during periods of slow funding. The result is equipment, resources, and training vital to the defense of air power are left unfunded.
The defense of air bases, particularly in the "rear areas," has taken on more importance since the 9/11 attacks on the United States. It is thus vital that current force protection and base defense operations be tailored to meet the current threat and move away from an internal looking guard force. Our heritage and history however have been roadblocks to moving in this direction.
The historical lack of attacks on air bases in the rear area have led to a popular conception that defense forces should be focused on policing speeders, loud noise complaints, lost animals, and ensuring maintainers are wearing line badges. This historical legacy has the potential to lead to mass devastation to American air supremacy. We know from seized documents and previous attempts that insurgents have the desire and guidance to attack CONUS-based installations. It is now upon us to abandon the battleship mentality and move to a flexible, responsive defense force guided by ground intelligence and fused with the local communities that host air power installations.
